Introduction
Anticipating an earnings disappointment near or after the end of a fiscal quarter, some managers warn while others do not. The popular explanation for earnings warnings is the litigation argument: Managers preempt bad news to avoid litigation or reduce legal costs (Skinner [1994 (Skinner [ , 1997 ). A reputation-related explanation, however, has received little attention, even though Skinner (1994) acknowledges throughout his paper that his findings are consistent with both the litigation argument and the reputation argument. Skinner (1994, 40) suggests, ''Managers may also have reputational incentives to preempt negative earnings news.'' Based on anecdotal evidence, he speculates that firms that fail to warn are less likely to be followed by financial analysts. My study formally puts forward the reputation argument and examines it by testing the change in analyst following after a firm's failure to warn.
''Reputation'' has been loosely used by researchers and by the press in various circumstances. In information economics, ''reputation'' is a concept used only in a multiperiod game. It is the probability assessment of a player's ''type'' or ''attribute.'' This assessment is updated after each period of the game.
1 ''Reputation'' is specific to the attribute at issue. For example, a person may have a reputation for being punctual for work but a reputation for being tardy for parties.
As Wilson (1985) succinctly summarizes, whenever a player's type is not fully known to others, his strategy inevitably will be affected by his concern about others' assessment of his type-his reputation. As a result, he may adopt a strategy for a multiperiod game that he would not use in a one-period game. For example, a manager may not warn about bad news in a one-period game, but warn in a multiperiod game because he is concerned about the effect of having a reputation for being opaque on the behavior of financial analysts in the subsequent periods.
The role of reputation has been emphasized by survey studies (Gibbins, Richardson, and Waterhouse [1990] ; King, Pownall, and Waymire [1990] ). In a survey of chief financial officers (CFOs), Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005, 54) report that ''92.1 percent of the survey respondents believe that developing a reputation for transparent reporting is the key factor motivating voluntary disclosures.'' Their study further notes, ''76.8 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that disclosing bad news faster enhances the firm's reputation for transparent and accurate reporting'' (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005, 65) . Despite such importance being placed on reputation, the archival evidence on the role of reputation is scant and Skinner's reputation argument for bad-news disclosure (hereinafter ''the reputation argument'') remains untested.
2 My study fills this gap. The underlying assumption of the reputation argument is that managers' concerns about their reputations for being transparent about forward-looking earnings news (hereinafter ''reputation'') propel them to warn the market of an anticipated earnings shortfall. 3 For example, if a firm enjoys a stellar reputation, the manager may disclose the bad news that he has to assure market participants that the firm is indeed transparent. If a firm's reputation is low, the manager may strive to build a reputation by issuing a warning. In a world in which managers and analysts (investors) both hold rational expectations (Muth [1961] ), the following must be true for reputation to be a valid concern to managers: among firms with 1. See Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) for the seminal reputation models and Diamond (1989) and Stocken (2000) for the applications of reputation models in the capitalmarket setting.
2. Williams (1996) and Hutton and Stocken (2006) examine a firm's reputation for forecast accuracy. For bad-news disclosures, forecast accuracy or credibility is typically not an issue (Mercer [2005] ); instead, the issue is whether to disclose-that is, transparency.
3. Throughout the paper, I assume that a manager's interest is aligned with the firm's interest and use the manager's reputation and the firm's reputation interchangeably. a high reputation, those that fail to warn will be perceived as less transparent than those that warn; among firms with a low reputation, those that warn will be perceived as more transparent than those that do not warn.
As a researcher, I do not observe that analysts update their beliefs about a firm's transparency after a disclosure decision. I do observe, however, the change in analysts' interest in following a firm after the disclosure decision. Previous studies suggest that analysts largely play the role of public-information intermediaries, that is, they mainly collect, digest, synthesize, and disseminate public information. For example, Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002) and Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) find that analysts' reports complement firms' public disclosures. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find high analyst coverage for high disclosure rating firms and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) find a decrease in analyst coverage for firms whose disclosure ratings have declined. Acting mainly as public-information intermediaries, analysts would be less interested in following a firm that has become less forthcoming, such as withholding bad news.
I hypothesize that firms that fail to warn will experience a decrease in analyst following relative to those that have similar reputations before the disclosure event and warn. Comparing warning and nonwarning firms across different preevent reputations does not test the reputation argument. For example, a warning firm with an already high reputation cannot further improve the reputation. A nonwarning firm with an already low reputation cannot further damage its reputation. Comparing these two groups would lead to a wrong conclusion that the disclosure decision does not matter when in fact it matters.
For the empirical tests, I collect a group of warnings and a group of nonwarning events in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (post-Reg FD) era. Both groups have a disappointing quarter, that is, the earnings realization (assuming managers have private signals about this realization) is lower than the market expectation near the end of the fiscal quarter. The warning group warns about this earnings disappointment; the nonwarning group does not warn. I refer to the disappointing quarter as the ''event quarter,'' the four preceding quarters as ''preevent,'' and the four subsequent quarters as ''postevent.'' I examine the change in analyst following from the pre-event to the postevent period.
4
I find in the multivariate test that relative to warning firms with a similar pre-event reputation, nonwarning firms experience a significant decrease in analyst following. This result is obtained after I control for firms' performance, the change in other disclosure activities from pre-event to postevent, and the estimation bias from firms' self-selection into the warning and nonwarning groups. Here the control for self-selection is crucial because a firm may be more likely to warn for unobserved reasons that also discourage analysts from following the firm.
A decrease in analyst following is a cost to firms. Analyst coverage makes a firm better known to investors and generates investors' interest in the stock.
Financial theories on information risk argue that high analyst coverage likely reduces information asymmetry, which in turn reduces the cost of capital (Easley and O'Hara [2004], 1573) . Empirical studies have found that analyst following improves stock liquidity and firm value (Chung and Jo [1996] ; Healy, Hutton, and PalepuHutton [1999] ; Roulstone [2003] ). Thus, my finding of a decrease in analyst following after a firm's failure to warn suggests a reputational cost to firms for withholding bad news.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the research hypothesis and Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical model and Section 5 reports the test results. Section 6 examines the subperiods. Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis

Direct Implications of the Reputation Argument
The reputation argument implies that a firm will be viewed as less transparent when bad news is withheld than when it is disclosed. Suppose discrete measures are used for reputation-high, medium, and low, which is often the case in practice. The reputation argument implies the following. First, if a firm with an already high pre-event reputation warns, the reassessed probability of its being transparent (hereinafter ''perceived transparency'') will remain high; if it fails to warn, the perceived transparency will decrease. Second, if a firm with a medium pre-event reputation warns, the perceived transparency will increase but will decrease if the firm fails to warn. Third, if a firm with a low pre-event reputation warns, the perceived transparency will increase but will remain low if the firm fails to warn.
Testable Implications of the Reputation Argument
Because analysts' beliefs are unobservable, I use the change in analyst following after the warning decision to infer the change in a firm's transparency as perceived by analysts. Analysts' interest in following a firm could be affected by their assessment of the firm's transparency in one of two ways. If analysts mainly act as public-information intermediaries, a decrease in perceived transparency would discourage analysts from following the firm. If analysts are mainly private information generators, a decrease in perceived transparency would encourage analysts to follow the firm.
The decision for an analyst to follow a firm depends on the costs and benefits of following the firm. A major benefit of following a firm is to generate commission fees for the brokerage house because, thanks to the analyst who follows the firm, investors trade stocks with which they are familiar. Another benefit of following a firm is to know the firm well so that the brokerage house will have the opportunity to underwrite the firm's future equity issues and consult the firm on mergers and acquisitions.
Analysts incur costs in their activities. When they are public-information intermediaries, they collect, digest, integrate, and disseminate market, industry, and firm-specific public information. In doing so, analysts take advantage of their financial expertise, the economy of scale in information gathering, and the synergy of covering multiple firms in one industry. These activities thrive on corporate disclosures and analysts' reports complement such disclosures. A decrease in a firm's transparency would discourage analysts from following the firm. When analysts search for private information, they visit stores and factories and interview a firm's major customers, suppliers, and alliances. A decrease in transparency would encourage analyst following because corporate disclosures likely preempt analysts' disclosure of private information.
Most archival evidence suggests that analysts mainly act as public-information intermediaries. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) report that about 20 to 26 percent of analyst recommendations and revisions of earnings estimate are issued at the earnings announcement date and the following two days, even though these three days account for only 5 percent of the sixty-day examination window. This observation suggests that analysts' reports complement corporate disclosure. Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002) find that the magnitude of market reaction to analysts' reports and the magnitude of market reaction to firms' earnings announcements are positively correlated. This result is confirmed by Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) , suggesting the complementary nature of analysts' activities and corporate disclosures. Furthermore, Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) report that analyst following is higher for firms that have higher or increased disclosure ratings. These studies strongly support the public-informationintermediary role of financial analysts. Thus, I predict the following: H 1 : Nonwarning firms will experience a decrease in analyst following relative to warning firms that have similar pre-event reputations. In particular, H 1a : Among firms with a high reputation, those that fail to warn will experience a decrease in analyst following relative to those that warn. H 1b : Among firms with a medium reputation, those that fail to warn will experience a decrease in analyst following relative to those that warn. H 1c : Among firms with a low reputation, those that warn will experience an increase in analyst following relative to those that do not warn.
Data
I collect earnings warnings from the First Call Company-Issued Guidelines (CIG) database (see Table 1 ). Before Reg FD, which was enacted on October 23, 2000, firms that did not warn publicly might have warned analysts privately. To maintain a good reputation with analysts, managers may resort to either private or public warnings. Given that private warnings are unobservable, testing the effects of reputation on analyst following before Reg FD is not feasible. Therefore, I use post-Reg FD disclosure data (including the four pre-event quarters), resulting in 
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Exclude warnings for which the recent analyst consensus forecast before the warning is unavailable.
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Warning sample 1,517 Figure 1 shows that firms' negative quarterly guidance arrives in two waves. The first wave centers at the end of the first fiscal month (i.e., around the previous-quarter earnings announcement date) and I refer to such guidance as ''forecasts.'' The second wave is around the fiscal quarter-end and, consistent with Wall Street, I refer to such guidance as ''warnings.'' The key difference between these two types of disclosures is the amount of private information that managers have at the time of disclosure. ''Forecasts'' require both a manager's ability to predict early in the quarter and his willingness to share the prediction with the public. At the time of the disclosure decision, the fiscal quarter is almost over and the manager should know how the firm has fared, and thus ''warnings'' require mainly a manager's willingness to share.
I use warnings rather than forecasts to test the reputation argument for two reasons. First, what underlies the reputation argument is ''transparency,'' that is, the willingness to disclose. The absence of a warning indicates a manager's unwillingness to disclose, whereas the absence of a forecast indicates either a FIGURE 1
Firms' Voluntary Disclosure of Negative Earnings News
Source: The data source is the First Call Company-Issued Guidelines (CIG) database. Note: First Call collects company disclosures from press releases and interviews, compares a disclosure with existing market expectations, and codes it as D for negative news for the variable CIG-CODED. The figure shows the timing of negative earnings news issued in my sample period after I exclude 178 observations for which the news is issued 180 days before the fiscal quarter-ends and 20 observations for which the news is issued 90 days after the fiscal quarter.
5. To better control for time trends in the tests, I calendarize the quarters: A firm's fiscal quarter is labeled to the calendar quarter with which it overlaps most. For example, fiscal quarters that end in May, June, and July belong to the second calendar quarter.
manager's inability to predict early in the quarter or his unwillingness to disclose. 6 Second, my examination of warnings is consistent with a series of recent studies, such as Kasznik and Lev (1995) ; Soffer Thiagarajan, and Walther (2000) ; and Atiase, Supattarakul, and Tse (2006) . 7 Therefore, I retain the 2,073 warnings from the initial sample.
The sample cleaning is as follows. I exclude 156 events whose unique identifiers in Compustat (''gvkey''), Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) (''permno''), and Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) (''ticker'') are unavailable. Fifty-one firms issue a second warning for the same quarter, in which case I keep the first warning because the first dose of warning is arguably more alarming. I delete twenty-five warnings that are issued close to (i.e., within three days) or after the event-quarter earnings announcement: the former have little information value and the latter probably are caused by data errors. Among the remaining warnings, five are excluded because no recent analyst consensus from I/B/E/S is available and eight are dropped because their stock prices are less than $1-small deflators may lead to outliers.
Finally, 311 warnings have the price-deflated earnings surprise between 0 and À0.001. The magnitude of such earning surprises is extremely small. These earnings surprises are calculated by researchers using earnings realizations. At the time of the disclosure decision, a manager may not be aware of such an extremely small earnings shortfall unless he has perfect foresight. I exclude these 311 events and am left with 1,517 events as my final warning sample.
Nonwarning observations are identified as the firm-quarters for which the forthcoming earnings are less than analysts' most recent consensus before the third fiscal month but for which the firms do not warn according to CIG. After applying the same screening procedures as for the warning sample, I am left with 9,057 nonwarning events. Table 2 shows the industry distributions of warning and nonwarning events. The business services, retail, and chips industries have the highest number of warnings, while the percentage of warning firms is the highest in the retail, consumer goods, and steel industries.
Empirical Model 4.1 Dependent Variable
I measure the dependent variable ChgFollow as the change in average analyst following from pre-event to postevent. Analyst following in each quarter is 6. If a firm issues an unfavorable earnings forecast early in the quarter, analysts would revise their earnings estimates downward and consequently the earnings surprise calculated using the expectation later in the quarter is probably non-negative. The firm is then neither in my warning nor nonwarning group.
7. These studies examine disclosures issued in the sixty-day window before the quarterly earnings announcement date. This window is comparable to mine because earnings typically are announced twenty-five to thirty days after the fiscal quarter end. the number of analysts whose earnings estimates are included in the most recent I/B/E/S consensus compiled before the earnings announcement date. If a firmquarter is covered by Compustat but not by I/B/E/S, analyst following for this firm-quarter is zero.
Explanatory Variables and Coefficient Predictions
My explanatory variables are the dummy variable Warn (one for a warning observation and zero for a nonwarning observation), the proxies for pre-event reputation, and the interaction terms between Warn and these proxies. A firm's pre-event reputation is unobservable; I proxy it by the disclosure frequency in the pre-event period on the ground that pre-event reputation should be highly positively correlated with the number of actual forward-looking earnings disclosures issued by the company. To measure this frequency, I identify earnings guidance for either forthcoming fiscal years or quarters in the CIG database. In my sample, the median of this frequency is one, the seventy-fifth percentile is four, and the ninetieth percentile is seven. Of the sample, 46.8 percent do not issue any guidance in the pre-event period. I place firms that issue no disclosures in the pre-event period into the ''low'' reputation group. The dummy variable DisLow is one for these firms and zero for the others. I place firms that issue four or more disclosures in the pre-event period into the ''high'' reputation group. The dummy variable DisHigh is one for these firms and zero for the others. I place the remaining firms into the ''medium'' reputation group. 8 In my sample, 25.8 percent of the firms are in the high-reputation group, 27.4 percent are in the medium-reputation group, and 46.8 percent are in the low-reputation group. Hypotheses H 1a , H 1b , and H 1c are then tested by eq. (1):
The following illustration shows that testing Hypotheses H 1a , H 1b , and H 1c is equivalent to testing three sets of coefficients. In Figure 2 , the symbol ''X'' indicates that the referred coefficient is a component of the change in analyst following for a particular group. For example, the average change in analyst following for nonwarning firms in the high pre-event reputation group is (b 0 þ b 2 ), while the average change in analyst following for warning firms in the same group is
To test Hypothesis H 1a -that is, whether among the firms with a high pre-event reputation, nonwarning firms experience a significant decrease in analyst following relative to warning firms-I test whether (b 1 þ b 3 ) > 0. Similarly, the test for Hypothesis H 1b is whether b 1 > 0 and the test for Hypothesis H 1c is whether (b 1 þ b 5 ) > 0.
I also compare the effects of withholding bad news across firms of different pre-event reputations. The average change in analyst following for nonwarning firms with a high pre-event reputation is (b 0 þ b 2 ), whereas the average change in analyst following for nonwarning firms with a medium pre-event reputation is b 0. Thus, a negative b 2 would indicate a higher penalty for silence to firms with a high pre-event reputation than for those with a medium pre-event reputation. Similarly, a positive b 4 would indicate a higher penalty for silence to firms with a medium pre-event reputation than to those with a low pre-event reputation.
Control Variables
I control for five factors that affect analyst coverage: (1) performance, (2) earnings variability, (3) the change in a firm's other disclosure activities (rather than the warning event), (4) the level of analyst following before the event quarter, and (5) self-selection.
8. In robustness tests, I find no change in the conclusions if the cutoff of three or five is used for the medium and high reputation groups.
Performance
Prior studies suggest that analysts tend to follow firms that are performing well. Chung and Jo (1996, 496) argue that ''more analysts follow high quality firms than low quality firms because brokers find it easier to market stocks of high quality firms.' ' Hayes (1998) demonstrates analytically and McNichols and O'Brien (1997) find empirical evidence that analysts initiate coverage of firms that have good earnings prospects and drop those with lackluster earnings performance, because a trade on a poorly performing stock is more likely to be a sale and the trading volume generated by a sale is limited to investors' initial holdings when short sale is restricted. Thus, analysts potentially can generate more trading commissions from well-performing stocks than from poorly performing stocks.
I control for performance by including (1) the event-quarter earnings disappointment (Surprise), (2) the number of quarters in the pre-event period for which the firm fails to meet or beat analyst expectations (PastMiss), (3) the change in core earnings from the pre-event to the postevent period (ChgEPS), and (4) the event-quarter stock performance (Return).
I use Surprise to control for the severity of the negative earnings news in the event quarter and include its quadratic term to allow for curvature in the relation. For a warning observation, Surprise is the difference between the forthcoming earnings per share (EPS) and the most recent analyst consensus before the warning (both from I/B/E/S). For a nonwarning observation, the variable is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the last analyst consensus before
FIGURE 2 Empirical Predictions
Pre-event Reputation
Note: X indicates that the referred coefficient is a component of the change in analyst following for a particular group. For example, the average change in analyst following for nonwarning firms with a high preevent reputation is (b 0 þb 2 ).
the third fiscal month of the event quarter. As in Kasznik and Lev (1995) , Surprise is deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter stock price.
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Note that Surprise is negative for all sample firms. I expect a positive coefficient on Surprise (i.e., a larger decrease in analyst following after a more negative value of Surprise) and a positive coefficient on the quadratic term (i.e., the curve flattens out for a large magnitude of bad news).
Analysts may react to a firm's poor performance with a delay, so I use PastMiss to control for recent lackluster earnings performance. PastMiss is the number of earnings-disappointing quarters in the pre-event period. A quarter is disappointing if a company's realized earnings are lower than the most recent analyst consensus before the third fiscal month (both from I/B/E/S).
10 I use the consensus before the third fiscal month instead of the consensus just before the earnings announcement as the expectation benchmark. I do not use the latter because analyst expectations could have been revised downward after a public warning and the firm would appear to have met or beat consensus on the earnings announcement date even though the quarter is truly disappointing. I expect a negative coefficient on PastMiss.
I control for the change in average core earnings from pre-event to postevent (ChgEPS). Core earnings are the realized EPS recorded by I/B/E/S, which removes special items. The earning change is deflated by the beginning-of-theevent-quarter stock price. I predict a positive coefficient on ChgEPS.
Finally, I control for stock performance. Return is the buy-and-hold stock return from the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the eventquarter earnings announcement, less the buy-and-hold return of an equal-weighted market index over the same period. I expect a positive coefficient on Return.
Earnings Variability
I control for the change in earnings variability from pre-event to postevent (ChgEarnVolt). Bhushan (1989) argues that analysts follow firms that have high performance variability so that analysts can add value to the earnings-predicting activity, presumably by exerting their superior information-processing abilities. I measure earnings variability for the pre-event and postevent periods using the average absolute seasonal-differenced, split-adjusted diluted EPS (from Compustat) 9. In this study, all earnings-related variables are deflated by stock price to control for the scaling difference in EPS. To avoid outliers created by small deflators, I drop the observations whose deflator is less than one.
10. If a quarter is not covered by analysts, the quarter is not marked as ''disappointing.'' Thus, my measure of PastMiss is lower for firms with lower analyst coverage in the pre-event period. Because I control for pre-event analyst following in the multivariate test, this measurement issue should not be a concern.
in that period.
11 The variable is deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-eventquarter stock price and I predict a positive coefficient.
Other Disclosure Activities
I control for the change in firms' other forward-looking disclosure activities. Warning is only one disclosure event, although a significant one. Analyst following may change as a result of the change in a firm's other disclosure activities after the warning event. As discussed in Section 2, an increase in other corporate disclosures should attract analysts. I include ChgDis, measured as the change in the total number of company guidance events recorded in the CIG database from pre-event to postevent and predict a positive coefficient.
Pre-Event Analyst Following
The change in analyst following is perhaps nonlinear to the pre-event level. An increase in analyst following is more likely for firms with a low level to begin with than for those with a high level. Similarly, a decrease in analyst following is more likely for firms with a high level to begin with than for those with a low level. I control for PreFollow, measured as the average analyst following in the pre-event quarters. Analyst following in each quarter is the number of analysts whose estimates are included in the most recent consensus before the quarterly earnings announcement. I predict a negative coefficient on PreFollow.
Estimation Bias from Self-Selection
Some unobservable reasons may make firms more likely to warn. For example, a new chief executive officer (CEO) may be more likely to warn to blame the departing CEO for the shortfall. If these reasons also affect analysts' decisions to continue to cover a firm (e.g., the analyst's contact is no longer with the firm), a portion of the observed change in analyst coverage is attributable to the effect of unobservable reasons. I control for this estimation bias from self-selection by using a modified treatment-effect model. A frequently used method in the accounting literature to control for self-selection bias is the treatment-effect model described by Greene (2003) . Under this method, researchers estimate a first-stage choice model, calculate the inverse Mills ratio for the event and nonevent firms (the calculations are slightly different for the two groups), and then add this variable to the regression of interest in the second stage. Tucker (2007) modifies the standard treatment-effect model by allowing the event and nonevent groups to each have its own coefficient on its respective inverse Mills ratios. She also provides concrete interpretation for the inverse Mills ratios and their coefficients.
I estimate a probit model of warning versus nonwarning decisions using the specifications in Tucker (2007) . For brevity, the variable definitions and estimation results are provided in Appendix A. Let Z denote the row vector of the observable variables capturing managers' considerations in the warning decision and g be the column vector of the estimated coefficients. The inverse Mills ratio (Mill) for a warning observation is calculated as /ðZ i cÞ=UðZ i cÞ, and that for a nonwarning observation is calculated as ½À/ðZ i cÞ=ð1 À UðZ i cÞÞ. Here, f(.) and F(.) are the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
After adding the quarterly dummies to control for time trends in analyst following, I sum up the regression in the following equation: 
Empirical Results
After applying the data requirement for the first-stage warning choice model (Appendix A), 1,481 warning and 8,504 nonwarning observations remain. In this section, I first present the descriptive statistics associated with the test of analyst following changes. I then report the primary test results. Finally, I briefly discuss alternative model specifications.
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 3 presents the number and percentage of warning and nonwarning firms in each pre-event reputation group. The high-reputation group has 807 warning firms and 1,774 nonwarning firms. The medium-reputation group has 486 warning firms and 2,249 non-warning firms. The low-reputation group has 188 warning firms and 4,481 nonwarning firms. Overall, the majority of warning firms (54.5%) belong to the high-reputation group, whereas only 20.9 percent of nonwarning firms are from the high-reputation group. In contrast, the majority of nonwarning firms issue no forward-looking earnings disclosures in the pre-event period (i.e., low-reputation group), whereas only 12.7 percent of warning firms are silent (or opaque) in the pre-event period. Thus, most warning firms have a high reputation to begin with and most nonwarning firms are opaque before the event quarter. It appears that in the face of bad news managers issue a warning to maintain the existing high reputation.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, ChgFollow, and the control variables for this sample. The change in analyst following for nonwarning firms has a mean of À0.04 and the change for warning firms has a mean of À0.23. The change for nonwarning firms is more favorable Table 3 uses 1,481 warning and 8,504 nonwarning firms that have available data for the warning choice model in Appendix A. Firms with four or more earnings guidelines in the pre-event period are classified into the ''high'' reputation group. Firms with one to three earnings guidelines in the pre-event period are classified into the ''medium'' reputation group. Firms with no earnings guidelines in the pre-event period are classified into the ''low'' reputation group.
Variable Definitions: ChgFollow is the change in average analyst following from the four pre-event to the four postevent quarters.
Surprise: For a warning observation, the variable is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the most recent analyst consensus before the warning (both from I/B/E/S). For a nonwarning observation, the variable is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the last analyst consensus before the third fiscal month of the event quarter. The variable is deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter stock price.
(continued) than the change for warning firms (between-group t-test statistic ¼ 2.50; Wilcoxon z-statistic ¼ 2.54, unreported). This difference, however, could be due to warning firms experiencing a more permanent decline in future earnings (ChgEPS, between-group t-test statistic ¼ À5.00; Wilcoxon z-statistic ¼ À9.62, unreported) or more nonearnings bad news (Return, between-group t-test statistic ¼ À15.53; Wilcoxon z-statistic ¼ À15.80, unreported).
12 It would be rather hasty to conclude from the univariate comparison that withholding bad news helps firms keep analysts.
Primary Results
I report the multivariate test of the full model in the last column of Table 4 with the coefficients on the quarterly dummies suppressed. The estimation is robust to possible violations of the normality assumption of the error term. More important, it is robust to outliers in both the dependent and independent variables by automatically, in each iteration, setting aside influential observations and down-weighting observations with large residuals.
The coefficient on Warn, b 1 , is 1.398, both statistically (t ¼ 6.05) and economically significant, indicating that among firms with a medium pre-event reputation, nonwarning firms suffer from a loss of 1.398 analysts relative to warning firms. This finding supports Hypothesis H 1b . The sum of coefficients for Warn and Warn*DisHigh, (b 1 þb 3 ), is 1.433 with the Wald-test F statistic being PastMiss is the number of earnings-disappointing quarters in the four pre-event quarters by comparing realized earnings with the most recent analyst consensus before the third fiscal month.
ChgEPS is the change in average realized EPS (recorded by I/B/E/S) from the four pre-event to the four postevent quarters, deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter stock price.
Return is the buy-and-hold stock return from the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement, less the buy-and-hold market return.
ChgEarnVolt is the change in average absolute seasonal-differenced diluted EPS from the four preevent quarters to the four postevent quarters, deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter stock price.
ChgDis is the change in the total number of company guidance events, recorded in the First Call CIG database, from the pre-event to the postevent period.
PreFollow is the average analyst following in the four pre-event quarters. Analyst following in each quarter is the number of analysts whose forecasts are included in the most recent consensus before the quarterly earnings announcement.
PreDisclosure is the total number of company guidance events (about both fiscal year and fiscal quarters) in the pre-event period, according to the CIG database.
TABLE 3 (Continued)
12. On average, the magnitude of the event-quarter earnings shortfall is smaller for nonwarning firms than for warning firms, although the medians are similar.
TABLE 4
Multivariate Test significant at 64.00, indicating that when the pre-event reputation is high, a failure to warn is associated with a decrease of 1.433 analysts. This finding supports Hypothesis H 1a . The sum of coefficients for Warn and Warn*DisLow, (b 1 þ b 5 ), is 1.585 with the Wald-test F statistic being significant at 32.37, suggesting that among firms with a low pre-event reputation, those that warn experience an increase of 1.585 analysts relative to those that do not warn. This finding supports Hypothesis H 1c . The joint test for all the three pre-event reputation levels yields an F statistic of 21.59, statistically significant, supporting my overall hypothesis (Hypothesis H 1 ). The documented decrease in analyst following represents a reputational cost to firms for withholding bad news. I compare the reputational cost for withholding bad news to firms of different pre-event reputations. The coefficient on DisHigh, b 2 , is significantly negative at À0.129 with a t-statistic of À2.05, suggesting that among nonwarning firms those with a high reputation experience a larger loss of analysts than those with a medium reputation. The coefficient on DisLow, b 4 , is weakly significantly positive at 0.090 with a t-statistic of 1.85, suggesting that among nonwarning firms, those with a medium reputation experience a (weakly) larger loss of analysts than those with a low reputation. These results imply that withholding bad news is more costly to firms with a higher pre-event reputation than for those with a lower reputation.
Most of the coefficients on the control variables have the expected sign. As predicted, analyst following decreases for firms with poor past performance Note: 1. The estimation uses 1,445 warning (Warn ¼ 1) and 8,033 nonwarning (Warn ¼ 0) observations that have available data. The estimation requires two steps to control for self-selection bias. In the first step, I estimate the warning-choice probit model (Appendix A) and calculate the inverse Mills ratio (Mill). In the second step, I add Mill to the analyst coverage regression, allowing the warning and nonwarning groups to each have its own coefficient. 2. I report the robust-regression estimations with the coefficients on the quarter dummies suppressed.
Such estimations are robust to outliers in the dependent and independent variables by automatically, in each iteration, setting aside influential observations and downweighting observations with large residuals. This method does not assume normality and theoretically possesses about 95 percent of the efficiency of ordinary least squares (OLS). 3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent in a two-tailed test, respectively. The t-statistics are in the parentheses.
Variable Definitions
ChgFollow is the change in average analyst following from the pre-event to the postevent period. DisHigh is one if the total number of earnings guidelines in the pre-event period (i.e., Predisclosure) is four or higher and zero otherwise.
DisLow is one if the firm issues no earnings guidelines in pre-event period (i.e. Predisclosure) and zero otherwise.
See Table 3 for other variable definitions.
TABLE 4 (Continued)
(Surprise, PastMiss, and Return) and a deterioration in future performance (ChgEPS). Analyst following increases when firms increase other disclosures (ChgDis). Contrary to my prediction, the change in earnings variability is not associated with changes in analyst following. The coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is significantly negative for both the warning and nonwarning groups. The negative coefficient for the warning group suggests that, within this group, some unobservable reasons make a firm more likely to warn and at the same time discourage analysts from following the firm (see Tucker [2007] ). The negative coefficient for the nonwarning group suggests that within this group some unobserved reasons make a firm less likely to warn and at the same time encourage analysts to follow the firm. The significance of both coefficients indicates the importance of controlling for self-selection. 
Alternative Model Specifications
The first three columns of Table 4 report the test results of alternative model specifications (quarterly dummies are included in the estimations but suppressed in the table). In the first column, I leave out the pre-event reputation proxies and the terms for correcting self-selection estimation bias. The coefficient on Warn is significantly positive at 0.188 with a t-statistic of 3.60, indicating that, on average, analyst following decreases for nonwarning firms relative to warning firms. Recall that in Panel B of Table 3 the univariate comparison of ChgFollow yields the opposite result. The different conclusion in the multivariate test shows the importance of controlling for performance, other disclosure activities, and the mean-reverting property of analyst following.
The second column adds the inverse Mills ratios to the regression. Mill is significantly negative for both the warning and nonwarning groups. After additionally controlling for self-selection bias, the coefficient on Warn is significantly positive at 1.143 with a t-statistic of 7.10.
14 These results suggest that the control for self-selection substantially improves the test results, although it does not change the conclusion.
The third column uses a simple count of pre-event-period disclosures, PreDisclosure, rather than the trichotomous variables DisHigh and DisLow. The coefficient on Warn is significantly positive at 1.078 with a t-statistic of 4.12, 13. The results are similar if the standard treatment-effect model is used. I also estimate the model without Mill. The sum of coefficients on Warn and Warn*DisHigh, (b 1 þb 3 ), is 0.278 with the Wald-test F statistic being significant at 13.65, indicating that when the pre-event reputation is high, a failure to warn is associated with a decrease of about 0.3 analysts. The coefficient on Warn and the sum of Warn and Warn*DisLow coefficients are both positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting no difference in analyst following between the warning and nonwarning groups when firms have medium or low reputations. The weaker evidence confirms the importance of controlling for selfselection estimation bias.
14. If a standard treatment-effect model were used, the coefficient on Warn would be 1.188 with a t-statistic of 7.90, and the coefficient on Mill would be À0.603 with a t-statistic of À6.93.
suggesting that a firm with no disclosures in the pre-event period would have about one more analyst after it warns than a similar firm that does not warn. The coefficient on PreDisclosure is significantly negative at À0.041 with a t-statistic of À4.14, suggesting that the more transparent a firm is before the event, the larger the decrease in analyst following in the absence of a warning. If a firm warns, however, the frequency of pre-event disclosures does not have an effect on analyst following subsequent to the disclosure event, because the coefficient on Warn*PreDisclosure of 0.045 (t-statistic ¼ 2.93) offsets the coefficient on PreDisclosure of À0.041. The result that PredDisclosure does not matter to warning firms likely is due to my constraining the relation between ChgFollow and PreDisclosure to be linear.
Disclosure Reputation and Stickiness of Corporate Guidance Practices
My paper focuses on firms' disclosure reputation for being transparent-a concept in a multiperiod game. Prior research has noted that corporate earnings guidance practices are sticky (Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner [2007] ). An interesting question is to what extent a firm warns as a result of following its sticky guidance practice. If a firm typically provides guidance at the time of the warning, the warning in the event quarter would be unsurprising. I collect earnings guidance for the same quarter (as the warning-event quarter) in the prior year issued during the window in which warnings typically are collected (i.e., from the beginning of the third fiscal month to three days before the earnings announcement date). I find that 4.6 percent of the sample firms issued such guidance and warn in the event quarter, 8.8 percent issued such guidance but do not warn in the event quarter, 9.8 percent did not issue such guidance but warn in the event quarter, and 76.8 percent did not issue such guidance and do not warn in the event quarter. These patterns suggest that most warnings are issued not because of the stickiness of a firm's guidance practice. 15 6. SubPeriods I divide the sample into an early period and a recent period using the cutoff of 2003Q1 for three reasons. First, although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-the most sweeping security regulation after the security laws of 1933 and 1934-was passed in July 2002, most of the recommended changes took effect near or after the first quarter of 2003. Examples of such changes were requiring at least one audit committee member with financial expertise, transparent communications about board operations, audit of internal control over financial reporting, and disclosures of off-balance-sheet arrangements and non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles financial measures. Such stringent regulations and enhanced corporate governance have provided investors with additional monitoring means. As a market-based monitoring tool, reputation is expected to play a smaller role in the recent period when other monitoring tools are strong.
My second reason for dividing the sample is that some of the market participants might have adopted a different view of firms' disclosure practices after 2003. On December 13, 2002, Coca-Cola publicly announced that the company would no longer provide quarterly earnings guidance. The announcement had a ripple effect: Several high-profile companies followed suit in early 2003, claiming that the guidance cessation was intended to direct investors' focus from short-term results to long-term goals. As a result, in the mind-set of some, nondisclosure is a virtue, not a sin (CFA Institute [2006] ; Hsieh, Koller, and Rajan [2006] ; U.S. Chamber of Commerce [2007] ). This change in attitudes may affect analysts' responses to warning versus nonwarning in the recent period.
My third reason for dividing the sample is that the early period is a bear market and the recent period is a bull market. Veronesi (1999) argues that the market handles bad news differently in a bear market than in a bull market. He predicts that market participants are more disappointed with bad news in good times than in bad times because bad news in good times likely signals a regime shift: The good state is over. Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) find supporting evidence for this prediction. Therefore, being informed of bad news in good times could be more valuable than in bad times. Consequently, failures to warn in a bull market may lead to more reputational damages than such failures in a bear market. Panels A and B of Table 5 provide the descriptive statistics for the early and recent periods separately. The two periods differ in several variables, confirming that the sample partition is justified. In the early period, analyst following decreases in a similar degree for both warning and nonwarning firms, whereas in the recent period the change for both groups is less negative and the change for nonwarning firms is in fact positive. In addition, the stock returns for warning firms (Return) are more negative in the early period than in the recent period, even though the magnitude of earnings surprise is similar. This comparison suggests that warning firms in the early period might have accumulated a greater amount of nonearnings bad news and the release of bad news is less timely than in the recent period.
Panel C of Table 5 reports the subperiod estimations. The test results are similar to the full-sample results with one notable exception. The decreases in analyst following for nonwarning firms relative to warning firms with a high, medium, and low pre-event reputation are 2.396, 2.085, and 2.138 in the early period, respectively. The corresponding numbers for the recent period are 1.238, 0.958, and 1.372. After stacking the subperiods with a dummy variable to distinguish the two sets of independent variables, I find that the differences above also are statistically significant (F¼16.11, t¼1.89, and F¼4.42 for the high, medium, and low reputation groups, respectively). These comparisons indicate that the reputational cost for withholding bad news is higher in the early period than in the recent period. This evidence is contrary to the regime-shifting argument, but it is consistent with either tightened regulations or shifting attitudes against quarterly earnings guidance in the recent period.
Conclusion
My study fills the void in the literature by empirically testing whether firm managers have reputation-related incentives to preempt negative earnings news. I find that analyst following decreases for firms that fail to warn relative to those that have similar pre-event disclosure reputations and warn. The loss of analyst coverage represents a reputational cost to firms for withholding bad news. My findings confirm managers' concerns that withholding bad news would damage their reputation with financial analysts. The evidence elevates the discussion of reputation in both academia and practice. 
